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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FIRST NATIONAL BANK
IN GRAND JUNCTION,
a National Banking Association,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RALPH OSBORNE and
JIM L. HUDSON,
Defendants and Appellant.

Case No.
12804

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NOTE: For clarity the Appellant will be referred to as Hudson and the Respondent as Bank.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Hudson's statement is satisfactory.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Hudson's statement is correct.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Bank requests the Court to affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except as set forth hereafter, Bank agrees with
Hudson's statement of the facts.
1

( 1) On pages 8-9 of his Brief, Hudson presents
the testimony of the Bank's vice president, James
Mackley, as his personal standard of conduct:
... that it is not his practice to either meet
with or in any fashion contact out of town
guarantors to verify the guarantee, even if
the guarantor is unknown, so long as he
(Mackley) is satisfied everything is in order;
. . . (R. 142-145)
This statement in Hudson's Brief is stated in
terms of the first person, whereas Mr. Mackley testified in terms of the third person, i.e., the First National Bank in Grand Junction.
(2) Page 9, Brief of Hudson:
When asked how the funds were disbursed, Mr. Mackley testified that the proceeds of
the loan were disbursed directly to or for the
benefit of Osborne, and that none of the proceeds were disbursed to Hudson. (R. 141)
Mr. Mackley testified that G,S far G,S he knew, the
funds were disbursed to Osborne, and that Mackley
made no disbursement of funds to Hudson. (Emphasis added).
(3) The following additional facts are submitted by Bank:
(a) Hudson, personally and through
counsel, neither admits nor denies that the
signature upon the Loan Guaranty Agreement
is that of defendant Jim L. Hudson (R. 7 and
R. 98); however, Hudson does not quarrel
with the conclusion of Mr. Harris, the hand2

writing expert, that it is Hudson's signature.
(R. 43)
(b) Hudson, personally and through
counsel, admits that he does not know how his
signature came to be placed on the Loan Guaranty Agreement. (R. 7 and R. 98)
( c) The handwriting expert also stated that the Loan Guaranty Agreement was not
slipped into a stack of documents to be signed
in a series; if it was in a stack of documents,
it was the top or first document. (R. 44-45)
( d) Hudson is a sophisticated businessman, well versed in commercial transactions.
For example, he has been in mineral exploration (R. 48, 92); he has an accountant working for him (R. 49); he and his accountant
jointly owned an office building (R. 50); he
has bought savings certificates ( R. 50) and
sold them (R. 51); he has purchased Moab National Bank stock ( R. 55) ; he has signed a
note as guarantor for a friend (R. 57-58); he
has a contractor do work for him (R. 57);
he considered buying control of the 'Moab National Bank (R. 61-62); he owned a motel (R.
88); he owned a car-wash (R. 90); and five
or six hundred documents have been prepared
by Hudson's attorney for him since approximately 1956 (R. 93).
( e) Mackley testified that the words
"guaranty" and ~'co-signer" are used pretty
much interchangeably in his business. (R. 131,
157-158) A separate guaranty is preferred
in Mackley's business. (R. 131-132) At the
time of the loan (to Osborne), Mackley wanted a guarantor or co-signer. (R. 132-133)
3

, ··

(f) Mackley has been in the banking
business since 1954 and has been with the Bank
since 1962 ( R. 17) ; Mackley had commercial
dealings with Osborne, both as a loan officer
and as a correspondent bank representative
for six years prior to trial (R. 18, 122-123) ·
Bank had commercial dealings with Osborn~
since 1961 (R. 124); Bank made many loans
to Osborne prior to 1969 (R. 124-126); Bank
would not loan $60,000.00 to Osborne without
security (R. 29); Bank would not loan the
money to Osborne with Hudson as a guarantor
without the financial statement of Hudson (R.
129-130) ; Bank received Hudson's financial
statement ( R. 130) ; Mackley cannot remember what steps he took to verify Hudson's financial statement, but knows he did satisfy
himself that it was valid (R. 134, 144); Mackley had authority to loan to the maximum lending limit of the Bank, $200,000.00, without reference to a loan committee (R. 138-139);
Mackley attempted to call Hudson to verify
the guaranty (R. 140); if Bank is satisfied
everything is in order, it normally will not hold
up disbursement of the loan to contact the cosigner or guarantor ( R. 143) ; there is a constant flow of commercial documents between
Bank and Moab National Bank ( R. 145) ;
Bank in its correspondent bank position with
Moab National Bank has shared a number of
loans with Moab National Bank (R. 146); and
the form of Loan Guaranty Agreement is used
by the banks (R. 158).
(g) Hudson's witness, Utah State Bank
Examiner, Mr. Chatelain, was not familiar
·with the practices of banks in Grand Junction
( R. 182). Mr. Chatelain conceded that considerable discretion is vested in loan officers
4
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as to the making of loans, even to poor risks
based on character alone (R. 186-187).
ARGUMENT
Hudson, in his Amended Answer, denies that he
signed the Loan Guaranty Agreement and alleges, as
an affirmative defense, that if he did sign, his signature was fraudulently obtained "by trick, ruse~
sleight of hand or other artifice" on the part of Osborne. Hudson makes no other claim that would relieve him of liability if he did sign the Loan Guaranty
Agreement. Therefore, the trial court has properly
framed the issues in this case, as follows:
1. Did Hudson sign the Loan Guaranty
Agreement?
2. Did Osborne defraud Hudson to obtain
Hudson's signature on the Loan Guaranty
Agreement?

3. Did the Bank have knowledge of, participate in, or was it chargeable with notice of
the purported fraud to obtain Hudson's
signature on the Loan Guaranty Agreement? (R. 204)
With regard to the first issue, the court found
that Hudson signed the Loan Guaranty Agreement,
and this finding is not sought to be reversed by Hudson.
With regard to the remaining two issues, hereafter referred to as "Point I" and "Point II," the
5

trial court has adopted the general rule in this country which is set forth in Annot. 71 A.L.R. 1278:
... in the United States, when a principal obligor has induced his surety or guarantor to
sign an instrument by false or fraudulent representations, such misrepresentations may not
be set up by the surety or guarantor as a defense to an action on the indorsemen t or guaranty unless the obligee or guarantee had notice ,
of, or participated in, such fraud.
POINT I
HUDSON DID NOT PROVE HIS SIGNATURE
WAS FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED BY OSBORNE.

Rule 9 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that "In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity.... " Claims of fraud
must be pleaded with particularity; therefore, it follows that they must be proved with particularity.
Not only must the particular facts of the fraud be
proved, but the burden is clearly upon the party (in
this case Hudson) asserting the fraud. The evidence
of fraud must be clear, precise, and indubitable. The
leading Utah case in this regard is Johnson v. Allen,
108 U. 148, 158 P.2d 134 (1945), wherein the Court
stated, at p. 138:
In Kelley v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.,
supra[lOO Utah 436, 116 P.2d 386], we quoted with approval from Pennsylvania R. Co. v
Shay, 82 Pa. 198, in which it was stated: "It
6
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has been more than once held that it is error to
submit a qiiestion of fraud to the jury upon
slight parol evidence to overturn a written instrument. The evidence of fraud must be clea.r_.,
precise and indubitable; otherwise, it should
be withdrawn from the jury." (Emphasis added.)
The leading case in Utah as to the elements of
fraud is Oberg v. Sanders, 111 U. 507, 184 P.2d 229
(1947), wherein, at p. 234, the Court cited the elements from Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 U.
495, 227 Pac. 791 (1924), as follows:
" ... (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; ( 3) its materiality; ( 4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its
truth; ( 5) his intent that it should be acted
upon by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; ( 6) the hearer's ignorance
of its falsity ; ( 7) his reliance upon its truth ;
( 8) his right to rely thereon; ( 9) his consequent and proximate injury."
One searches in vain through Hudson's Brief
(including all evidence which Hudson claims to have
been erroneously excluded by the trial judge) to find,
with any degree of particularity, statements, supported by references to the evidence, setting forth the
fraud practiced on Hudson. Hudson does not know
what happened (R. 7 and R.98) and did not offer
any evidence to show how his signature came to be
placed on the Loan Guaranty Agreement. The excluded evidence referred to in Points I and II of Hudson's Brief, showing that Osborne may have used
7

some of the loan proceeds to cover his misappropriations at the Moab National Bank, that he was convicted of a crime for those misappropriations, and
that Osborne, in getting Hudson to guaranty the loan,
"was able to hang one in him," does not shed any light
on how Hudson's signature came to be placed on the
'Loan Guaranty Agreement. Giving the evidence cited
in Hudson's Points I and II the most favorable interpretation to Hudson, it only shows that Osborne was
in trouble, that he may have used some of the money
in an attempt to deal with his trouble, and that he
didn't like Hudson. This interpretation does not show
any fraud practiced upon Hudson by Osborne with
respect to the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agreement, and certainly it does not show what the fraud
was. vVe are left only to speculate as to what happened. It is submitted that even with all evidence and all
proffered evidence refused by the trial court, Hudson
has not met his burden of proof as to fraud. Accordingly the rejection by the trial court of any proffered
evidence would be harmless errer (if error at all),
and not grounds for reversal of the trial court. U.R.C.P. 61; U.R.E. 5.
POINT II
HUDSON DID NOT PROVE THE BANK HAD
NOTICE OF ANY PURPORTED FRAUD.

In the event the issue of fraud set forth above is
determined adversely to Hudson, there is no need to
consider the issue of notice. In the event the Court
8

does consider the issue of notice, it is to be noted that
Hudson does not maintain that the Bank had actual .
knowledge of any purported fraud or that the Bank
participated in any purported fraud. The trial court
in rendering its opinion considered the evidence in
the case and the proffered evidence of Mr. Chatelain
which the court refused to admit into evidence and
properly decided that reasonable minds could not differ and the Bank had no notice of and was not chargeable with notice of any purported fraud. ( R. 206-207)
Each point raised by Hudson in his Brief will be
rebutted point by point.
REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT I
A. THE EVIDENCE IS NOT RELEVANT
AND MA TE RIAL.
The important question before the Court with
regard to fraud is: "What was the fraud, if any, upon Hudson that induced him to sign the Loan Guaranty Agreement?" Hudson's answer is, "We do not
know." Hudson must show fraud to sustain his burden
of proof, and this cannot be done by saying, "We do
not know what happened." A person should not be
able to avoid a written instrument and his signature
on it by saying, in essence, ''I cannot remember signing that instrument." The argument made by Hudson in Point I goes to show that Osborne embezzled
money from the Moab National Bank and that he applied such money to his own purposes. Nothing in
Hudson's Point I shows how Hudson can demonstrate
9

the elements to bring this case within Stuck v. Delta
supra, to establish that Osborne made a representa~
tion to Hudson; that the regresentation was false·
that the representation was material; that Osborne'
knew any such representation was false; or that Os.
borne intended that any such representation be acted
upon by Hudson.
The "scheme or plan" referred to in Hudson's
Point I is based upon conjecture and speculation and
does not show a "scheme or plan," but the mere possibility of one. This "scheme or plan" set forth in
Point I contains numerous flaws and incorrect statements of fact. For example, Point 2 ( c), on page 27
of Hudson's Brief, indicates that he was deceived and
tricked into signing the Loan Guaranty Agreement·
There is not one scintilla of evidence of this in the
record to support this view except Hudson's self-serving statement to the effect that he "doesn't know"
how his signature got on the Loan Guaranty Agreement. This is an essential point that cannot be assumed, but must be proved by Hudson! With regard to
paragraph numbered 2 ( d) on page 27 of Hudson's
Brief, there is no evidence to indicate that Osborne
tried to convince the Bank not to contact Hudson.
Hudson at pages 32 and 33 speculates that Osborne was under a ''compelling necessity" to obtain a
signature from Hudson which was witnessed in order
that such signature could be compared with the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agreement. There is
no evidence to this effect. The comparison of one sig10

-nature to another signature is not facilitated by having a witness to one signature. Hudson on page 33
would have this Court believe that Osborne concocted
the story that he and Hudson might be able to purchase the controlling stock interest in the Moab National Bank. There is no evidence in the record that
this "story" is not completely true. Hudson and his
accountant, both Moab residents and active in its business community, cooperated to submit Hudson's financial statement (R. 48-58, 172-177). This fact, plus
Hudson's admitted prior purchase of Moab National
Bank stock ( R. 55) and previous guarantee of other
persons' loans ( R. 80) strongly suggest that Osborne' s story was in fact true.
The most that can be said for the argument in
Hudson's Point I is that the evidence sought to be admitted might be useful to corroborate other evidence.
But there is no other evidence!
B. GENERALLY, A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IS NOT ADMISSlBLE IN A CIVIL CASE.
The cases and authorities cited on pages 29
through 31 of Hudson's brief all refer to criminal
cases, where evidence of a prior crime is sought to be
admitted against a person who committed the prior
crime. This is a civil case. The general rule throughout the United State is that a conviction in a criminal case is not admissible in a civil case as evidence
of facts upon which a conviction is based. Annot., 18
A.L.R. 2d 1290. This appears to be the purpose of
11

Hudson in seeking to introduce this evidence, since
Hudson seeks to go into the detail of the embezzle.
ment. The following quotation is found at page 13 of
93 A. 2d in the case of Mead v. Wiley Methodist Epi,s.
copal Church, 23 N.J. Super 324, 93 A.2d 9 (1952):
The weight of authority in New Jersey
and throughout the United States favors the
rule that a judgment of conviction or acquittal
rendered in a criminal prosecution, cannot b~
shown in evidence in a purely civil action to
establish the truth of the facts on which it is
rendered. (Cases cited) .
Hudson's Brief, at page 34, cites U.R.E., and
certain language is italicized. U.R.E. 55 might justify the admission of Osborne's criminal conduct if
Osborne's testimony were in issue in a suit between
Hudson and Osborne to establish their respective liabilities; however, in this case the issue relates to
Hiidson's conduct as it affects his liability to the
Bank. Even if U.R.E. 55 were applicable and Os·
borne's criminal conduct was admitted into evidence,
it would only show Osborne had a motive to obtain
money to cover his embezzlements and would not
prove the element of fraud practiced upon Hudson. ,
Osborne's criminal conduct would not explain how
Hudson's signature got on the Loan Guaranty Agreement.
C. THE EVIDENCE PROPOSED IS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL MATERIAL.
The trial court expressed concern that the in12

troduction of evidence regarding Osborne's embezzlement would unduly prejudice the jury. (R. 10) The
trial court was obviously concerned with this matter
throughout the proceedings of this trial, as evidenced
by the trial court's granting of a motion for change of
venue from 'Moab to Monticello because of the prejudicial effect of trying this case in Osborne's and Hanson's home town. Even if the Court should find as relevant that evidence relative to Osborne's embezzlement which was excluded, it is permissible for the
trial court to exclude this circumstantial evidence
upon the ground that it would creat unfair prejudice.
U.R.E. 45 (b) is as follows:
DISCRETION OF JUDGE TO EXCLUDE
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will ... (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury ...
NOTE: This applies to frequently arising
situations where the trial may get out of hand
by the injection of collateral issues having only
slight probative value and which would tend to
confuse the jury, or have illegitimate emotional appeal. Obviously, the judge should have
some discretion to prevent the trial from going off on tangents of relative unimportance.
Likewise some protection is needed from unfair surprise with respect to such matters.
This represents the sort of thing which the
trial judge does every day in actual practice
13

and which is sanctioned here, in the assurance
that the results of rare and harmful abuse of
discretion will be readily corrected on appeal.
It is a rule of necessity. Its sanction cannot
be escaped if we are to have orderly and efficient trial procedure.
Accord, Bunten v. Dav'is, et al., 82 N.H. 304, 133 Atl.
16 (1926); State v. Flett, 234 Or. 124, 380 P.2d 634
(1963).
The case of Underwood v. Strasser, 48 Wis. 2d
568, 180 N.W. 2d 631 (1970), stressed the importance of Rule 303 of the Model Code of Evidence (the
parallel rule to U.R.E. 45), giving the trial judge dis- ,
cretion to exclude admissible evidence if its probative
value is outweighed by the risk that its admission
will create substantial danger of undue prejudice or
of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
The Court is referred to State v. Winget, 6 Utah
2d 243, 310 P.2d 738 ( 1957), wherein Justice Wade
thoroughly discussed this point in a criminal law context, at pages 739-40 of the Pacific Reporter.

1

The Court should be reluctant to reverse the trial
court in a matter of this nature, since the trial judge ,
is in a unique position to judge the exigencies of a
particular case, and he has the duty to keep the trial
within proper bounds.
REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT II
The trial court found that the statement of Osborne to May was not a declaration against interest,
or, perhaps more properly, an admission against in·
14

terest ( R. 108, 110-112). The Court's attention is
directed to U .R. E. 63 ( 7) and ( 10) for such distinction. It is submitted that the trial court is correct,
that the statement of May is vague and ambiguous
and not an admission against interest. It is susceptible, as the trial judge pointed out, of more than one
interpretation. For example, one could conclude from
the language that Hudson's signature was rightfully
on the Loan Guaranty Agreement and he was going
to have to pay it since Osborne could not. If that were
the case, Osborne would be "hanging one in" Hudson.
(R.111-112). The evidence was offered as an exception to the hearsay rule. If admitted in this manner,
as stated in Hudson's Brief at p. 38, the language
"must have been expressed in definitive, certain and
unequivocal language ... " An excellent statement
regarding relevancy and materiality, applicable to
the case at hand, is found in the civil case of State v.
Lee, et al., 227 Ind. 25, 83 N.E. 2d 778, at p. 780
(1949):

The exact question presented with respect
to the admissibility of the exhibit so far as we
can find, has not been presented to this court
before. It must therefore be determined by the
application of the general rules with respect
to legal relevance. While offered evidence may
be logically relevant, its admission must be
subject to the primary test of its value in the
particular case. Practical conditions do not permit the court to hear every matter that may
be in any degree logically relevant to the issue,
but require that matters received as evidence
shall have a higher degree of probative force
15

which may be termed legal relevancy or materiality. Offered evidence which does not measure up to this requirement may be properly
rejected. The exclusion of evidence as not material either because too remote, too uncertain
or too conjectural is a matter largely within
the discretion of the 'trial court. See 31 C.J.S.
Evidence §159, p. 866; Nickey v. Zonker, 1903:
31 Ind. App. 88, 90, 67 N.E. 277; Insurance
Co. of North America v. Brim, 1887, 111 Ind. '
281, 286, 12 N.E. 315; Jones v. Julian, 1859
12 Ind. 27 4; 20 Am.J ur. Evidence§§ 246, 247:
p. 239,240.
The Court is also referred to U .R. E. 1 ( 2) .
RE BUTT AL TO HUDON'S POINT III
It appears to Bank that the trial court's ruling

in refusing to receive the evidence of Hudson's witness, Utah State Bank Examiner, Mr. Chatelain, is
founded on 'the fact that he was either ( 1) not qualified to set forth a standard applicable to this case, or
(2) if so qualified, that no standard is applicable upon the particular facts of this case. Mr. Chatelain was
unable to state that he was familiar with standards
o'f bankers in the locality of Grand Junction, Colorado. (R. 182). Note that Mr. Chatelain was never
asked if he was familiar with the standards of bankers in Moab, Utah, and therefore never stated that
he was familiar with such standards. Interrogation
of Mr. Chatelain by the trial judge (R. 186-187)
clearly showed that loan officers are vested with
great discretion and that insufficient evidence had
16
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1

--been presented to establish a commercial standard
against which to measure Mackley's conduct; therefore, the Court refused to admit the evidence. See U.
R.E. 57. The trial court referred to the case of Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, 24 Utah 2d
172, 467 P. 2d 610 (1970), as being a similar case to
the one at hand ( R. 181). In that case the court held
that the standard of care to which an architect was
held was the standard of a reasonably prudent architect practicing in the locality in question. Accordingly, the standard to be used in this case, if applicable,
is that of a reasonably prudent banker practicing in
the locality of Grand Junction, Colorado, and Moab,
Utah. This approach is also approved in II Wigmore,
EVIDENCE §461 (3rd ed.), wherein it is stated, at
pages 489-490, that a standard of conduct is a matter
of substantive law, and testimony of a person regarding that standard is receivable only as some evidence
of the standard. The testimony as to the conduct of
others must be as to conduct occurring under circumstances substantially similar. The trial court in the
instant case decided that Mr. Chatelain could not
testify because no standards in the Moab, UtahGrand Junction, Colorado, area were established
against which to measure the Bank's conduct.
There is a further fundamental reason why the
testimony of Mr. Chatelain was inadmissible. The
standards referred to in Point III of Hudson's Brief
are standards established and existing for the proteetion and benefit of the depositors and stockhold17

ers of the banks. This is further reinforced by a reference to the hypothetical question put to Mr. Chatelain on pages A-14 to A-18 of Hudson's Brief which
refers to commercially reasonable standards in the
banking industry and includes factors such as:
1. That Osborne's net worth in and of itself
wouldn't justify a $60,000.00 loan.
2. That Mackley didn't have a current financial staJtement on Osborne.
3. That Mackley did nothing to verify the
financial responsibility of Hudson.
Mr. Chatelain's rejected testimony related to Mr. .
Mackley's obligations to the Bank and its depositors
and stockholders - not to Mackley's alleged duty to
Hudson, if any. The "reasonable commercial standards in the banking business" described in the proffered Chatelain testimony are not responsive to the
proposition Hudson sought to prove.
If this Court were to hold 'that Mackley had a
duty to personally contact the guarantor, Hudson, it
would impose upon all commercial transactions in
the State of Utah from this date forward a new and
novel burden. How could banks and all other business
enterprises respond 'to such a holding? It would require every guarantor to personally appear before
the lender! How otherwise could a lender be assured
that the guarantor would not attempt to avail himself of a defense based upon such a holding?

The question is whether Bank is chargeable with
18

notice of the alleged fraud. Bank agrees with the
principle announced in Jungk v. Holbrook, 15 U. 198,
49 Pac. 305, 307 ( 1897), that "If a party is put upon
injury as to a particular fact, he is charged in law
with whatever inqury will disclose."
The only inquiry in this situation which would
have indicated that the signature was fraudulently
obtained (if it was) would have been direct contact
with Hudson. Obtaining a credit report on Hudson
would have revealed nothing about how his signature
came to be placed on the Loan Guaranty Agreement,
but would only have shown that Hudson was a good
financial risk (R. 101). Likewise, contacting the
loan committee or another officer of Bank would not
have given any information about any alleged fraud.
What, then, are the circumstances, if any, wh'ich
would have raised the warning flag to Bank that the
signature was fraudulently obtained by Osborne so as
to charge Bank with a duty to contact Hudson? The
fact that Mackley did not know Hudson does not suggest any fraud was involved. The fact that the financial statement of Hudson was addressed to Moab National Bank was not out of the ordinary and, accordingly, does not suggest any fraud was involved. The
fact that the Loan Guaranty Agreement was not witnessed would concern Mackley only to the extent of determining the authenticity of the signature. Once satisfied that the signature was genuine (as it admittedly was) , there would be no reason to further pursue
that matter. The fact that Hudson signed the Loan
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Gauranty Agreement rather than the Note would not
suggest any fraud, especially since the Bank preferred a separate Loan Guaranty Agreement (R. 131132) · The blanks in the Loan Guaranty Agreement do
not raise an inference that something was amiss, since
the information inserted in the blanks was not significant and such information might have been filled in
by one of Bank's secretaries (R. 149). Osborne's
low net worth and borrowing history with the Bank
simply indicate that he could not borrow $60,000.00
on his own, not that he defrauded Hudson.
Sub-points A and B of Hudson's Point III will
not be rebutted in detail, the foregoing comments being applicable to such sub-points.
Hudson has referred to the Uniform Commercial Code for analogy. The Uniform Commercial Code
is not applicable to the instant case. This relates to
the Loan Guaranty Agreement, which is not a ·"negotiable instrument." U.C.A. §§ 70A-3-102(1) (e) and
78-3-104 (1953), as amended. Hudson has attempted
by this analogy to open Pandora's box to matters
which are not properly in the case, in particular the
questions of whether the First National Bank is a
"holder" or a "holder 'in due course." The drafters
of the Uniform Commercial Code, by not including
guaranties within the Code, obviously did not intend
to speak as to guaranties, and the Court should not
use the words of the Code '.for purposes other than
intended by the drafters of the Code.
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1

-REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT IV
Hudson labels this case as one involving fraud
in factum - that he signed a paper unknowingly.
There is no evidence to support this proposition other
than Hudson's protestation that he doesn't know how
his signature got on the Loan Guaranty Agreement.
Hudson failed to establish the facts necessary to prevail in this defense. To prevail, Hudson has the burden of proof to establish clearly, precisely, and indubitably that a fraud was practiced upon him. Page
6, supra. As Hudson concedes at page 56 of his
Brief, he must be free from negligence to be able to
rely on fraud in factum. Upon what evidence can
Hudson rely to support his claim that he was not negligent? Bank asserts there is no clear, precise, and
indubitable evidence to support his claim. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates the probability of
his negligence. What other rational explanation is
there? Hudson, a sophisticated businessman, who has
signed hundreds of legal documents and regularly
employs an accountant and a lawyer, signed the Loan
Guaranty Agreement which was not slipped into a
stack of documents (R. 44-45). People who sign documents which are plainly written, or maybe in blank,
must expect to be held liable thereon. Watkin Products, Inc., v. Butterfield, 274 Minn. 378, 144 N.W.
2d 56 ( 1966).
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In an attempt to present evidence of fraud in
factum, Hudson, on page 59 of his Brief, states the
following:
He (Hudson) was misled into believing
that he was signing some kind of paper relating to his waiver of interest on Certificates
of Deposit cashed prior to the end of the 90-day
period for which they were issued. ( Parenthetical added.)
There is no possible way that any of the evidence
in this case can be construed in the manner Hudson
attempts to construe it in the quotation above. There
is no evidence as to what Hudson "thought" he was
signing. The Certificates of Deposit were purchased
by Hudson in 1968 and surrendered by him prior to
June, 1969 (R. 85-86.)

1

REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT V
Hudson commences his argument by referring
to a remedy of summary judgment. This matter was
decided, by directed verdict, not summary judgment.
A summary judgment motion was made earlier in )
this case, and the trial court refused to grant it. The
trial court's refusal to grant summary judgment in
this case indicates its concern for a full hearing and ·
presentation of evidence in this matter.
1

A directed verdict should be granted, and sustained
on appeal, when there is an absence of any substantial evidence to support a verdict for defendant. Koer
22

v. Mayfair Market, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566

(1967). The Court is directed to the emphasized portion of Johmon v. Allen, supra, pages 6-7. In the case
at hand, there is a written instrument and only slight
parol evidence presented to overturn the written instrument. The evidence of fraud in this case is not
clear, precise, and indubitable.
CONCLUSION
I

Hudson signed the Loan Guaranty Agreement.
II

The burden of proof was upon Hudson to prove
with particularity and clearly, precisely, and indubitably that a fraud was practiced upon him by Osborne. Hudson failed to sustain that burden; therefore, judgment for the Bank follows as a matter of
law.

III
Even if Hudson had surmounted his heavy burden of proving fraud, he would then have been confronted by the task of proving the Bank's notice of the
fraud. Hudson's evidence did not prove his allegation; therefore, judgment for the Bank would follow
as a matter of law.
It follows from the foregoing that Judge Sheya
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correctly directed the verdict for Bank, and the judg.
ment of the trial court should be affirmed.
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